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Abstract
English This work addresses the analysis of the secondary use systems from Vanderbilt
University, Nashville Tennessee (USA), and a followed up comparison to German concepts
under the consideration of German legislation. In doing so important processes were
modeled based on an on-site visit and later on compared with data privacy concepts by
Technologie- und Methodenplattform für die vernetzte medizinische Forschung (TMF).
It was also addressed, to what extend an adaption of processes and methods would be
compatible with German data privacy.
The assessment of the results illustrates, that a better part of the underlying processes
from Vanderbilt could be transferred to Germany, but that certain tasks would have to
be implemented differently. It’s also emphasized, that in spite of preventive measures
and mechanisms risks for the privacy exist.
German Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Analyse der Secondary Use Systeme der
Vanderbilt Universität, Nashville Tennessee (USA), und einem anknüpfenden Vergleich
mit deutschen Konzepten und unter Berücksichtigung der deutschen Gesetzeslage. Dabei
wurden, auf Basis einer vor Ort durchgeführten Analyse, wichtige Prozesse modelliert und
im Anschluss mit den Datenschutzkonzepten der Technologie- und Methodenplattform
für die vernetzte medizinische Forschung (TMF) verglichen. Weiterhin wurde darauf
eingegangen, inwiefern eine Übertragung der Prozesse und Methoden mit dem deutschen
Datenschutz vereinbar wäre.
Die Bewertung der Ergebnisse zeigt, dass ein Großteil der zugrundeliegenden Prozesse in
Vanderbilt auf Deutschland übertragen werden können, jedoch bei gewissen Methoden
andere Ansätze gewählt werden müssen. Es wird ebenfalls hervorgehoben, dass es trotz
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1 Introduction
1.1 Aim and Motivation
Laws and insurance policy reasons obligate clinical staff to document every step of the
patients treatment path and in this process sizable amounts of data accumulate. In
the past the documentation was paper-based, but with compulsory periods of record-
keeping reaching from 10 to 30 years in Germany, huge amounts of paper cumulated
and recovery of documents was laborious. With technological advances in IT and
storage media, Electronic Medical Record (EMR)’s were a logical step forward to make
information retrievable and manageable again and nowadays every major hospital stores
their documentation digital.
The “natural” accumulation of data from routine patient care and the tremendous
information contained within this data is highly interesting for researchers. Different
projects address the utilization of these latent information pools for medical research1.
The expectation is, that systems which allow medical research by utilizing research
databases2 save a lot of time and money. Instead of going through patient files manually
a research database can make all the patients and their documentation searchable and
can present the information in a standardized and clearly arranged way. Finding sufficient
patients for rare diseases or risk factors can be simplified and accelerated when searching
through data of whole populations and consequently saving time that can be spend on
actual research.
C. Safran states that “Secondary use of health data can enhance health care experience
for individuals, expand knowledge about disease and appropriate treatments, strengthen
1GANI_MED: http://www.medizin.uni-greifswald.de/gani_med/; visited: 06.09.2011
EHR4CR: http://www.ehr4cr.eu/; visited: 06.09.2011
2See Fundamentals Chapter 2.2
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understanding about effectiveness and efficiency of health care systems, support public
health and security goals, and aid businesses in meeting customers’ needs” [Safran et al.,
2007, Page 1].
In contrast, patient data can’t be shared and used for research purposes at will, because the
use of this sensitive data is directly conflicting with a persons privacy rights. Certain laws
and regulations in every country, like the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz3, Landesdatenschutz-4
and Krankenhausgesetze5 in Germany and the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) in the United States, constrain hospitals to ensure patient privacy
when sharing information. These laws define what can be shared or used for research
and in which form. At the same time, in the US, the National Institute of Health (NIH)
has a Data Sharing Policy for projects that receive $500.000 or more in annual funding
[National Institute of Health, 2003] that was “designed to increase access to data collected
through, or studied with, federal funding” [Malin, 2010a, Page 3] .
Nevertheless, even when complying to national laws secondary use systems, with non-
identifiable patient data, can be powerful tools for medical research.
At the beginning of this thesis, the secondary use concept propagated in the US, using the
example of Vanderbilt’s secondary use systems (Synthetic Derivative (SD) and BioVU)
will be analyzed and the applicability of its processes and methods for Germany will
be evaluated. This includes legal and technical standpoints, as well as ascertaining if
Vanderbilt’s processes and methods can be combined with secondary use approaches such
as TMF’s concepts.
1.2 Purpose of the Thesis
Secondary use systems are well known in the USA and used for a few years now. Today
in Germany secondary use systems are implemented as well but there is no long-standing
experience with such systems. To the knowledge of the author, no evaluation and
comparison of legal bases and data sharing concepts between the US and Germany
have been made so far. This thesis tries to answer the questions of compatibility and
portability of the US and German concepts.
3Federal Data Protection Act




From the above stated purposes, the following objectives can be derived:
1. Analyzing Vanderbilt’s secondary use processes including alpha numeric data and
Multimedia Objects (MMO)’s.
a) Analyzing Vanderbilt’s secondary use of genomic data and the integration
with clinical data.
b) Advantages and disadvantages of the approach, process and implementation.
2. Identifying threats to patients privacy and evaluating protective methods.
3. Review if the processes from Vanderbilt would be compatible with German regula-
tions and secondary use concepts.
a) Analyzing German privacy laws and regulations.
b) Compare analyzed processes from Vanderbilt with concepts in Germany.
4. Suggestions for processes/models suitable in Germany.
1.4 Issues to be addressed
From the in Chapter 1.3 mentioned objectives the following issues can be deduced:
1. Getting an overview of the laws and regulations in the US and Germany.
a) Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Landesdatenschutzgesetz / Krankenhausgesetz (Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Rhineland-
Palatinate).
b) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
2. Analyzing the systems and processes involved in and
3. Creating Use Cases of the secondary use process from Vanderbilt.
4. Comparison of the TMF data privacy protection concept and Vanderbilt’s processes
and methods.
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5. Analyzing re-identification threads and evaluating protection methods.
6. Assess if Vanderbilt’s process and methods are applicable with German law and
regulations.
7. If possible, adapt processes and methods from Vanderbilt for Germany.
1.5 Layout of the Diploma Thesis
This thesis is organized in five main chapters.
The first chapter gives some insight about the aims and motivation.
Chapter 2 characterizes basic information about Vanderbilt University Medical Center
(VUMC), its research and describes basic principles about secondary use and privacy
described. This section is important to understand the motivation for secondary use of
patient data and how VUMC operates in regards to research. It also outlines TMF’s
data privacy concept and gives a first insight into the statutory situation.
Chapter 3 describes the methods of how information about the miscellaneous topics
was gathered, which search terms were used, how the laws were evaluated and how
information was compiled. An overview of the tool used to create this work is presented
as well.
Chapter 4 covers identified processes, use cases and the system architecture of SD and
BioVU followed by a comparison of concepts. This chapter also describes the differences
and similarities of data sharing/research from a legal point of view and outlines risks
and risk prevention of Vanderbilt.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results, discusses the methods used, arrives at a conclusion of
this thesis and gives some thoughts on future prospects.
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2 Fundamentals
This chapter provides an overview of secondary use in clinical research and its risks for
personal privacy in general. It also highlights the associated laws and regulations in
the US and Germany, introduces data privacy concepts and re-identification risks will
likewise be introduced.
2.1 Secondary Use & Research Databases
A topic that got more attention over the past few years is secondary use of patient
data. Secondary use means, that information will be used for a purpose for which it
was not primarily acquired. In this context it means that patient information that was
collected through routine documentation in the hospital, is used for medical research.
Applications of secondary use in the medical field can be “disease specific clinical or
epidemiological research projects, health care research, assessment of treatment quality
and health economy”[Pommerening and Reng, 2004, page 1]. Pommerening also states
that typical aspects of secondary use are that “the data leave the context of the physician
where they are protected by professional discretion and that the identity of the patient
doesn’t matter.”[Pommerening and Reng, 2004, page 1]
Some positive aspects are that “Secondary use of health data can enhance health care
experience for individuals, expand knowledge about disease and appropriate treatments,
strengthen understanding about effectiveness and efficiency of health care systems, support
public health and security goals, and aid businesses in meeting customers’ needs” [Safran
et al., 2007, Abstract].
The information in EMR’s can’t be used directly. Privacy policies forbid the use of
identifying attributes called Protected Health Information (PHI)1, which are mandatory
1More detailed information on PHI can be found in Chapter 2.3.
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for patient care. One way to use that information nevertheless is the creation of databases
for research purposes only. No official definition could be found so in this thesis those
databases will be called Research Databases. Research databases are data repositories
that store information solely for the purpose of research, in other words they are the
primary tools for information gathering and analysis. This work will focus on research
databases where the patient information gets added in a automatic way, manually
maintained databases will not be considered.
2.2 Vanderbilt Medical University Center
This section describes the research environment used in Vanderbilt University. It also
describes the EMR of VUMC that is used for documenting the day to day patient care.
2.2.1 General Information
StarChart/StarPanel
In 2001 Vanderbilt completely replaced its first generation electronic patient record and
started using its self-made EMR system StarChart. By 2009 StarChart contained data of
over 1.8 million patients with more than 65 million documents2, going back to the 70’s
and with comprehensive data especially for the past ten years [Presentation Masys, 2010,
slide 11].
Its web-based component StarPanel integrates seamlessly and is generally used for
documentation nowadays.
Advantages of StarPanel over StarChart are that several patient charts can be opened
at the same time. A messaging system was implemented as well, so that clinical users,
health care professionals and patients can interact with each other, without the need of
a personal visit, for example when the patient just has a small question, which doesn’t
warrant a visit. Whole communications can arise this way, which can be saved and
included in the patients record. The documentation that is not done electronically will
be scanned, added to the record and the paper-based documents will be destroyed [Giuse,
2003, page 1].
2http://informatics.mc.vanderbilt.edu/archives/starchart 04/16/2009; visited 29.07.2011.
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StarBRITE (Biomedical Research Integration, Translation and Education)
StarBRITE is Vanderbilt’s web-based research portal, designed to ”bind data, information,
and knowledge to effective action in order to promote and speed the design and conduct
of research” [Harris et al., 2011, page 2]. Additionally, StarBRITE allows to collect and
analyze metrics routinely to analyze the effects of interventions designed to improve the
research process [Harris et al., 2011, page 2].
The system focuses on the researchers needs and supplies educational resources, assists
with research projects and their implementation, finding funding, data management and
provides access to Vanderbilt’s research databases.
As just mentioned, part of StarBRITE are the research databases, which are the Synthetic
Derivative, a de-identified3 copy of StarChart, and BioVU, Vanderbilt’s biobank. Since
the focus of this work lies on the secondary use systems both will be described in detail
in the next sections.
For more detailed information on StarBRITE [Harris et al., 2011] can be used as a
reference.
2.2.2 Research Databases
This subchapter gives an insight on Vanderbilt’s Research Databases Synthetic Derivative
and BioVU.
Synthetic Derivative
The Synthetic Derivative (SD) is a copy of StarChart, VUMC’s EMR, stripped of patient
identifying attributes called PHI.
The name Synthetic Derivative is composed of Derivative and Synthetic. “Derivative”
stands for the information content that is derived from StarChart but reduced by removing
patient identifiers. “Synthetic” stands for data that is systematically changed. Date
attributes for example are modified, by changing their value to address privacy concerns
while leaving the chronological context intact. [Presentation Masys, 2010, slide 2].
3Data stripped of identifying information; see Chapter 2.3.1.
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By 2008 SD contained about 120GB of information (not including images) and more
than 300 million observations for 1.4 million patients. By 2011 it included more than
1.95 million patients already [Roden, 2008, Harris et al., 2011].
Figure 2.1: Synthetic Derivative [Roden, 2008]
De-Identification As mentioned, PHI get removed before the data enters SD. This is
done by a method called de-identification, which is explained next.
De-identification for clinical data is done by DE-ID, a commercial tool developed by
DE-ID Data Corp4. DE-ID is a Natural Language Processing (NLP) tool, that “uses a
set of rules, pattern matching algorithms and dictionaries” [Meystre et al., 2010, page 9]
to find and remove PHI. The software removes the identifiers by replacing them with
tags that indicate the type of PHI that was removed5. This is done to keep readability
of the text intact. Same identifiers, e.g. names, gets replaced with the same tags to keep
the context. Vanderbilt additionally feeds “date shift values” into DE-ID so that dates
don’t get removed, but shifted back in time by 1-356 days.
4http://www.de-idata.com/; visited 29.07.2011.
5An example text can be found in the Appendix Figure 5.7.
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The whole de-identification process gets explained in detail in Chapter 4.2.2.
General problems with NLP are over- and undermarking, where words are marked as
PHI which are not and actual PHI get missed. Examples for over- and undermarking
can be found in the Appendix6.
Natural Language Processing An important task in the de-identification of patient
documents in Vanderbilt is Natural Language Processing (NLP). It allows the scrubbing
of documents that are written down as narrative text, so where the location of PHI is
not known beforehand.
De-identification using NLP algorithms can be separated into manual and automated
de-identification. Manual de-identification however is costly and the quality of the de-
identification is very depending on a persons abilities [Presentation Wasserstrom, 2010,
slide 8], therefor its not an option to use on a large scale. Automated de-identification on
the other hand is less costly and can have a high performance [Presentation Wasserstrom,
2010, slide 9][Aberdeen et al., 2010][Roden, 2008, page 2], depending on the algorithm
used. Automatic NLP is based on mostly two different groups of methodologies, pattern
matching and machine learning or a combination of both[Aberdeen et al., 2010, page 3].
DE-ID uses the former, in form of lists and dictionaries.
A more detailed, in-depth comparison of different NLP algorithms can be found at
[Meystre et al., 2010].
BioVU
Vanderbilt’s second research database is BioVU. BioVU is a biobank containing genetic
information extracted from leftover blood samples. The collecting commenced in 2007
and the database had about 91.000 samples at the end of 2010 [Harris et al., 2011, page
4], with every week between 500 and 900 new samples being added [Ritchie et al., 2010,
pages 2][Roden, 2008, page 3].
The information in BioVU is de-identified as well to fulfill the HIPAA privacy requirements
and is linked to data in SD (from the same patients), without any risk of discovering the
identity. The exact mechanism of linking both systems is described in Chapter 4.2.6.
6Figures 5.8; 5.9.
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Since genetic information is a delicate matter patients have the option to “opt out” of
BioVU. On the last page of the consent to treat form patients can check, that they
don’t want their leftover blood to be used for the DNA database. This procedure will
subsequently be termed opt out model.
Storage and usage processes of BioVU are explained in detail in Chapter 4.2.3.
2.3 Laws and Regulations
This chapter gives an overview about the judicial situation concerning privacy and data
sharing. Here the laws and regulations of the US and Germany are summarized and
briefly explained.
2.3.1 U.S.A.
In the United States a law ensures patient privacy while allowing data sharing called
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). It allows Covered Entities7
to share data in three ways, which are explained below.
Safe Harbor
Safe Harbor is the first method that allows data transfer. When Safe Harbor is applied
to a data set, 18 fields with identifying attributes called Protected Health Information
(PHI), like names, address, date of birth,... have to get scrubbed before the data may be
shared. This is done to ensure that neither “the individual, the individual’s relatives,
employers, nor household members” NIH [2004, page 10] can be identified.
A list with all identifying attributes can be found in the Appendix (Figure 5.11)
7HIPAA defined Covered Entities as
a) a health care provider that conducts certain transactions in electronic form
b) a health care clearinghouse.
c) a health plan.
source: https://www.cms.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/06_AreYouaCoveredEntity.asp; visited 12.07.2011.
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Limited Data Sets
Limited Data Sets are similar to Safe Harbor. The difference is, that not all the identifying
attributes have to be de-identified. 16 identifying attributes have to be scrubbed, but
fields like city, state, ZIP Code, elements of dates, and other numbers, characteristics,
or codes not listed may be kept. These attributes are useful and sometimes needed for
certain type of studies like epidemiology studies. Privacy concerns get satisfied by signing
a binding Data Use Agreement. The researcher getting access to the Limited Data Set
has to sign, that he will not try to re-identify patients among other things.
A list with all identifying attributes can be found in the Appendix (Figure 5.12)
Statistical Methods
Patient data can also be shared though other means than Safe Harbor or Limited Data
Sets. The shared data can have any format as long as an expert attests, by using generally
accepted statistical and scientific methods and principles, that the risk of re-identification
is “very small”. The statistician must document his methods and results and a covered
entity must keep the documentation for at least 6 years [NIH, 2004, page 10].
2.3.2 Germany
In Germany the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (eng. Federal Data Protection Act (FDPA))
together with Landesdatenschutzgesetze (eng. State Data Protection Act (SDPA)) and
Landeskrankenhausgesetze (eng. State Hospital Act (SHA)) manage the protection of
data privacy. In this thesis the State Data Protection Acts and State Hospital Acts
of the states Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and
Rhineland-Palatinate were looked at.
[Schütze and Oemig, 2010] compiled a table that shows in which state which law regulates
the privacy protection. An excerpt for the relevant states is shown in Table 2.1.
As can be seen in the table, a distinguishment has to be made between internal and
external usage. In this context internal usage means that the data is directly used
by the collector (usually the hospital or department itself) and external usage means
that data gets transferred to a different site. External usage has to be divided into
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external usage internal usage
public sites non-public sites research
BaWü SHA FDPA *
Bavaria SDPA/SHA FDPA permitted by SHA
Hesse SDPA/SHA FDPA *
MeckPom SHA SHA *
RP SHA SHA permitted by SHA
Table 2.1: Summarized table [Schütze and Oemig, 2010, Poster]
FDPA = Federal Data Protection Act
SDPA = State Data Protection Act
SHA = State Hospital Act
* subject to the possibility of authorization
öffentliche Stellen (eng. public bodies/sites), like hospitals financed by the state, and
nicht-öffentliche Stellen (eng. non-public bodies/sites), like private hospitals.
For secondary use of patient data only external usage applies, since data leaves the
oversight of the original source, as has been established in Chapter 2.1.
The following part of this section will highlight the articles that are of interest for external
usage. A short summary will be given as well.
Federal Data Protection Act (FDPA):
The FDPA8 manages the data privacy in Germany in regards to personal data. Its
legality applies to privacy in IT as well as manual processing of personal data. To account
for the differences and uniqueness of every state, the FDPA states that the statutes of
the SDPA’s overrule those of the FDPA9. If a state doesn’t specify a statute, the FDPA’s
statutes automatically take effect. [BRD, 2009a, Sec.1 subsec.2]
• Section15 subsection 1 paragraph 2 and Section 16 subsection 1 para-
graph 1 define when data may be transmitted to public and private sites. Data
may be transmitted if usage as defined by Section 14 is permitted.
• Section 14 allows usage among others if consent is given.
8[BRD, 2009a]
9Section 12 subsection 2 FDPA.
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Baden-Württemberg
In Baden-Württemberg non-public sites fall under the jurisdiction of the FDPA while for
public sites Baden-Württemberg’s SHA10 applies.
State Hospital Act:
• Section 46 subsection 1 paragraph 2a says that patient data may be trans-
mitted outside the hospital, if its necessary for medical research (by the hospital).
• Section 50 subsection 1 states that patient consent has to be obtained in
individual cases and that its not enough if the consent is obtained through general
admission requirements.
A hospital/physician will only share its/his data if something can be gained, so the
goal would always be research. This means that the requirements of the SHA for data
transmission would automatically be fulfilled.
Bavaria:
In Bavaria the SDPA11 as well as the SHA12 apply to public sites. Non-public sites are
covered by the FDPA.
SHA:
• Section 27 subsection 5 states that patient information may be transmitted
to a third party if the care context is given, permitted by statutory regulation or
patient consents are given.
SDPA:
• Section 15 subsection 1 paragraph 2 says that data processing (among others)
is allowed if the patient gave consent.
• Section 15 subsection 7 processing health related data (and others) is only





• Section 18 subsection 1 and Section 19 subsection 1 allow data transmission
to public and non-public sites, if the usage is permitted by Section 17 subsection
1 paragraph 2 and subsections 2 - 4, of which the following is of interest:
– Section 17 subsection 2 paragraph 2 permits the usage of data if consent
was given.
• Section 23 subsection 3 says that patient information has to be anonymized
once the research purpose permits it. Until then identifying attributes have to be
saved separately.
The bottom line of both laws is, that patient data may be transmitted if the patient gave
consent. However the last section cited has a technical implication, since it requires a
separation of data, so identifying attributes and medical data have to be separated in
research databases as well.
Hesse:
In Hesse, similar to Bavaria the states SDPA13 as well as the SHA14 apply to public sites
while the FDPA applies to non-public sites.
SHA:
• Section 12 subsection 1 explicitly states, that for hospitals the SDPA applies.
SDPA:
• Section 7 subsection 1 paragraph 3 says that data processing is only allowed
if patient consent is given (among others).
• Section 7 subsection 2 states that the consent has to directly relate to the data
specified.
• Section 7 subsection 4 processing health related data is only allowed as specified
in Section 33-35 + 39, of which the following is of interest:
– Section 33 deals with usage for scientific research. Of importance is subsec-
tion 2, which states that identifying attributes have to be saved separately




• Section 13 subsection 2 allows the usage of data for secondary use for the same
reasons that are stated in Section 12 subsection 2+3, where the following is of
interest:
– Section 12 subsection 2 paragraph 1 allows data acquisition15 if the
person concerned gave consent (among other thing).
The legal situation in Hesse is similar to Bavaria. The most important thing is that
consent has to be obtained and that medical and identifying attributes have to be
separated as well.
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania:
In Mecklenburg-West Pomerania only the SHA16 applies.
• Section 17 subsection 1 paragraph 6 permits data transmission for research
purposes through Section 20, which outlines the data usage for research.
– Section 20 subsection 1 allows patient data to be shared, if it got acquired
for Section 15 subsection 1, which states:
∗ Section 15 subsection 1 paragraph 1: patient data may only be
acquired and saved, if its for the contract governing medical treatment,
including the obligatory documentation requirements.
• Section 20 subsection 4 says that identifying patient attributes have to be saved
separately and that they should be deleted once the research purpose permits it.
The SHA allows data transmission for research purposes, if it got acquired for the
patients treatment. A separation of identifying attributes and medical data applies in
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania as well.
Rhineland-Palatinate:
In Rhineland-Palatinate similar to Mecklenburg-West Pomerania the states SHA17 covers
the patient privacy.




• Section 37 subsection 3 permits transmitting to and usage of patient data by
third parties for scientific research if the patient gave consent.
• Section 37 subsection 4 says that patient information has to be anonymized
once the research purpose permits it. Until then identifying attributes have to be
saved separately.
Similar to the other states, consent has to be given before the data may be transmitted.
A separation of data is noted as well.
German Genetic Diagnostics Act (GGDA)
The German Genetic Diagnostics Act (GGDA)18 regulates the genetic diagnostics and
the usage of genetic samples and data.
• Section 13 subsection 2 says that genetic samples may be used for a different
purpose than they were taken for, if permitted by law or if the patient gave consent
in writing after a briefing.
As Section 12 subsec. 2 shows, genetic samples can also be used for research, if the
patients gave consent.
2.4 TMF Data Privacy Concept
The Technologie- und Methodenplattform für die vernetzte medizinische Forschung (TMF)
is a Non-Profit-Organisation in Germany with the goals to
• improve the conditions for medical research in regards to quality, organization and
collaboration,
• answering of questions in networked medical research, legal & ethnic fundamentals
and quality assurance & quality management19.
The generic data privacy concepts A and B by the TMF will be described next as well as





MDAT = Medical Data
IDAT = Identity Data
PID = Patient Identifier
TTP = Trusted Third Party
Figure 2.2: Model A [Pommerening et al., 2009, page 6]
A characteristic of Model A is that the research database is in close relation to patient care,
which means that a physician has direct access to the database. Medical Data (MDAT)
and Identity Data (IDAT) are only known to the physician at the same time though, in
the system they are separated. The IDAT gets linked to a Patient Identifier (PID) and the
PID in turn to the MDAT. When the physician wants to enter data the “patient reference”
is dynamically generated via an identity management component called Patientlist, where
the IDAT-PID relation is managed. The Patientlist itself is located at a Trusted Third
Party (TTP). After positive authorization a temporary ticket will be handed out to
the physician and the Central Database (DB) for the duration of the session. The
Central DB can then be the starting point for secondary use. [Pommerening et al., 2009,
Pommerening, 2009]
Model B
In comparison to Model A in TMF’s Model B direct care context is not given. The
IDAT and PID are managed in a Patientlist, at a TTP as well. Additionally to Model
A the Patientlist is part of the quality management and assures that data from several
sources get assigned correctly. Before the data can enter the Central DB a second
security step has to be executed. At a second, different TTP a Pseudonym (PSN) is
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MDAT = Medical Data
IDAT = Identity Data
PID = Patient Identifier
PSN = Pseudonym
TTP = Trusted Third Party
Figure 2.3: Model B [Pommerening et al., 2009, page 7]
generated out of the PID. Unlike the Patientlist, no link is stored and only the key for
the generation is known. At the second TTP the MDAT can’t be accessed, it is encrypted
in a asynchronous way and can only be decrypted at the Central DB.
The generation of PSN’s out of PID’s makes the system error-tolerant, as a typing error
of the patient name for example gets ignored. The information can still be linked together
in the database because of the correct assigning of identity and PID.[Pommerening et al.,
2009, Pommerening, 2009]
Model BMB
The goal of Model BMB20 is to allow for the collection of samples in biobanks for research.
In this respect the model complies with Model B which gets extended for genetical
research and the storage of samples. The separation of IDAT and MDAT and the
generation of pseudonyms out of PIDs are consequently the same as in Model B.
Samples get stored in the Sample DB and are referenced as LabID for unique identification.
The ID gets created in a similar way to the PID, at the location where the sample is
20BMB = dt. Biomaterialbanken = eng. Biobanks.
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MDAT = Medical Data
IDAT = Identity Data
PID = Patient Identifier
LabID = Laboratory ID
OrgDAT = Organizational Data
AnaDAT = Analysis Data
Figure 2.4: Model BMB [Pommerening, 2009, page 21]
taken. The MDAT can reference a transformed LabID_tr instead of the regular LabID,
to add an extra level of security. LabIDs are also linked to Organizational Data (OrgDAT)
for data management purposes and are needed for the identification of Analysis Data
(AnaDAT) in the Analysis DB.
In conclusion, the Research DB links the PSN, MDAT and LabID/LabID_tr together.
[Pommerening, 2009, 2007]
2.5 Re-Identification Threat/Prevention
Patient privacy is a big concern when sharing data, and even though data sets might
seem un-identifiable, chances are that by combining data from several sources people’s
identities might be found nonetheless. In the mid 90’s Sweeney was able to identify
the medical record of the Governor of Massachusetts by combining publicly available
discharge summaries and voter registration lists. The re-identification was achieved by
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using the three non explicit21 identifiers ZIP code, Date Of Birth (DOB) and Gender
[Sweeney, 2002, page 3]. As a result her work was cited in the original publication of
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule and influenced the Safe Harbor policy [Malin, 2010a, page 4].
Research has also be conducted that shows that re-identification risk and costs22 vary
for the different states in the US [Benitez and Malin, 2010]. This results from different
states providing different information and not charging the same price for the voter lists.
El Emam and Dankar [El Emam and Dankar, 2008] describe two different scenarios
of re-identification attacks, one, termed prosecutor re-identification scenario, where a
“intruder” knows that a certain person is represented in the data set and wants to
find those records. The second scenario is called journalist re-identification scenario
and describes that a “intruder” doesn’t care about a specific person, but just wants to
re-identify someone. Sweeneys “attack” would fall into the latter domain.
People have their information in a multitude of places, for example when visiting
healthcare providers and leave a trail of information behind in this way. Using these
trails to re-identify individuals resulted in what’s called trail re-identification, which will
be described next after a quick excursion to Risk mitigation methods.
Risk Mitigation Information can be chanced for a variety of reasons, de-identification
being just one of them. There are four general methods, how this can be done, suppression,
generalization, randomization and synthesization. De-identification allows for all methods
to be applied and Vanderbilt uses three out of the four, however not all at the same time
and for the same purposes. The privacy model discussed later on in this chapter23 also
resorts to these methods.
Suppression is the simple removal of attributes that are too risky to be shared, the
name of a person for example. Generalization is often done with ZIP codes, when not
all the digits are displayed but only the first few which refer to a bigger region. With
randomization, as the name applies, an attribute gets different random value. Vanderbilt
is planning to randomize the names in SD for example to add an extra level of security.
A different method of risk mitigation is synthesization. Here the data doesn’t get shared,
21Explicit identifiers allow for direct identification. An example for explicit identifiers would be a set of
data containing name and address [Sweeney, 2000, page 6].
22Voter registration lists may be publicly available, but have to be purchased.
23See k-Anonymity 2.5.
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but compiled to aggregate statistics. From these “fake” statistics new, synthesized records
get generated.[Malin et al., 2011, page 3]
Trail Re-identification
Sweeney showed that by using seemingly anonymous data from the 1990 U.S. Census
summary and hospital discharge information, 87% of the US population could be identified
using only three attributes, 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date of birth24 as can be seen
in Figure 2.5. Even when using a two year age range instead of the date of birth, 0.01%
of the population is still identifiable, which would be about 3.1 million people today25.
DOB = Date of birth
Figure 2.5: Percentage of re-identification in the US based on gender (not displayed),
geography and age vary; [Sweeney, 2000, page 30]
There are different models which determine the trail re-identification risks by assessing
how many records relate to unique individuals or how many people a record can be
derived from [Malin et al., 2011, page 2]. Those models will not be highlighted in detail,
rather the concept of trail re-identification will be explained.
The idea behind trail re-identification is described by means of a example taken from
[Malin, 2010b] in Figure 2.6.
Imagine Ali, Bob, Charlie and Dan visiting three out four different hospitals in their
region and leaving their genetic information there for various purposes. In this example
it is assumed, that the hospitals disclose the identity data while the sensitive genomic
data is not revealed.
First the names and DNA sequences will be separated into different tables A (Identities)
and B (DNA). In the original table can be seen, that Bob and Dan did not leave their
DNA at every hospital they visited. Next the tables A and B are converted into matrices,
24Values from the discharge summaries and voter registration lists: Figure 5.3.
25Population of the US: 312,131,801
http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (09/03/11 at 18:07 UTC).
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Figure 2.6: Trail re-identification example; [Malin, 2010b, page 3]
where the * acts as a wildcard. This means that it represents both possible values, true
(1) and false (0) alike, since no DNA in table B doesn’t automatically mean that the
patient didn’t visit the hospital (as can been seen in Bob’s and Dan’s case). Now both
matrices are matched together and form the link matrix L. This is done by comparing
each row from one table with each row from the other one. If the visits match with the
DNA-patterns, the corresponding cell in matrix L gets a positive entry (1). As can be
seen, L indicates that Ali might have the DNA sequence actg or gatc, since the * in the
table could be a match as well. At the end the matrix will be reduced to perfect matches,
which link the DNA sequences to the identities and results in the re-identification (black
boxes). In Ali’s case actg was linked to him, because the sequence and his visits matched
perfectly while gatc had a wildcard at hospital 1.
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One model trying to prevent re-identification is briefly described next. Such privacy
models usually use suppression and generalization approaches described earlier to achieve
their privacy goals. The concept and idea of the model will be described only, for more
thorough information the stated sources should be visited.
k-Anonymity
Figure 2.7: k-Anonymity example; [Malin, 2008, page 5]
K-Anonymity is a privacy model, where data has to be changed in a way, that the
combination of quasi-identifying attributes appears in k pieces of the data set. The model
is based on the concept of indistinguishability in reference to the data set, as opposed to
its original source [Malin, 2008, page 4]. A data set with a range of attributes is said to
be k-anonymous, if for every row at least k-1 other rows exist that are undistinguisable
based on quasi-identifiers [Ciriani et al., 2007, page 4].
In a prosecutor re-identification scenario the worst case scenario would be that the
attacker matches his “target” against the smallest possible subset, which would be k for
k-anonymous data. So the greater k, the safer the identities are, but at the same time
the data set will be less differentiated.
Figure 2.7 shows an example of a 2-anonymous table, where attributes got removed by
suppression. As can be seen, between rows 1 & 4 and 2 & 3 can not be distinguished so
the table complies with 2-anonymity.

Other examples for privacy models are k-Ambiguity or k-Unlinkabilty. K-Ambiguity is
similar to k-Anonymity, but it defines indistinguishability as indiscernability in respect to
the original table, instead of equivalence [Malin, 2008, page 4]. A data set is considered
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k-unlinkable on the other hand, if every piece of data can be related to at least k identities
[Malin, 2006, page 107]. An example for a 2-ambiguous table can be found in Figure 2.7
and an example for for 2-Unlinkability can be found in the Appendix Figure 5.10.
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3 Methods and Materials
This chapter describes the methods and materials used for this thesis.
3.1 Literature Research
To get an overview of the publicly available information a systematic literature research
was conducted. To find relevant publications the search-engines PubMed1 and Google
Scholar2 were used and the period of searching ranged from October 2010 until April
2011. The literature research was done in two major stages, one prior to an on-site visit
at VUMC and one while at Vanderbilt.
The Following search terms were used prior to the visit:
database nih, database privacy rule, distributed databases, distributed databases privacy, re-
search database nih, research database, research database usa, research database nashville,
research repository, research repository hipaa, safe harbor, safe harbour, secondary use,
secondary use privacy, secondary use safe harbor, secondary use hipaa, secondary use
database, secondary use research database, hipaa, privacy rule, privacy rule hipaa, data
sharing privacy.
Where the search term was to generic no abstracts were reviewed and it was tried to
specify the term to a greater extent.
When starting with this thesis initial literature was given as well. This included in-
formation about Greifswald Approach to Individualized Medicine (GANI−MED) and




publications, Dept. of Biomedical Informatics Vanderbilt University, who has published
about data privacy topics, re-identification methods and prevention3.
The second research phase was not only about finding publications but also to gather
information about more general topics. To find publications PubMed and Google Scholar
were used and for general information Google’s regular search engine. Search terms
included: dbGaP, HIPAA, NLP, UMLS4, ICD5 9, ICD 10, StarPanel, WizOrder/Horizon
Expert Orders, Synthetic Derivative, BioVU, De-ID, MIST6, HMS Scrubber.
Upon arrival in Vanderbilt a list with related publications and topics of interest was
provided as well.
3.2 Legal Texts
Finding legal texts for the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, the Landesdatenschutz- & Lan-
deskrankenhausgesetze of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-West Pomera-
nia and Rhineland-Palatinate Google was used. Additional information about German
privacy policies was provided by Department of Information Technology and Medical
Engineering (ZIM) as well. Information about HIPAA was found via Google.
The articles in Chapter 2 are structured as follows and correspond to their German
counterparts:
• (eng.) Section (Sec.) = (ger.) Paragraph
• (eng.) Sub-section (Subsec.) = (ger.) Absatz
• (eng.) Paragraph (Para.) = (ger.) Satz
3.3 Interviews
During the stay at Vanderbilt several interviews were held. Given the different expertise of
the interview partners, no standardized form was prepared, but the questions were directed
3http://hiplab.mc.vanderbilt.edu/people/malin/CV.php#publications; visited: 09.03.2011.
4Unified Medical Language System (UMLS).
5International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD).
6MITRE Identification Scrubber Toolkit (MIST).
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at the respective field of interest. Interview partners included various IT/Privacy-Experts
and a Medical Doctor/Scientist.
3.4 Diagrams
The process model diagrams in Chapter 4 where created using the Business Process
Model and Notation (BPMN) 2 standard.
The most important elements used in this thesis are briefly described.
• Events are depicted as circles and indicate that something happened, like the start
or the end of a process.
• Activities are represented as rounded-corner rectangles and describe that something
has to be done. The most used Activity type used in this work are Tasks which are
single units of work.
• Gateways are represented as diamond shaped objects. At a Gateway, the process
flow can split or merge again, depending on the conditions of the process modeled.
At a Parallel Gateway two or more outgoing branches get executed simultaneously
for example.
• There are several Data objects, which show what kind of data is used, how its used
and where its saved. Data Output for example illustrates the data which is a result
of an Activity or Task.
An overview of BPMN’s core elements can be found in the Appendix7 and a thorough
description can be found in the standards specification8.
The use case diagram was created by the specification of Unified Modeling Language
(UML)9. The elements of use cases are:
• An Use Case symbolizes a certain functionality and sequence of actions. Use cases
are depicted as ellipses.




• An Actor represents a “user”, which can be a Person, Organization or external
system which interacts with the system being modelled. A stickman is the usual
graphical representation.
• A System Boundary Box is a rectangle drawn around use cases to indicate the
boundary of a system. Anything inside the rectangle is part of the system, everything
outside is not.
• There are four use case relationships: Include, Extend, Generalization and Associa-
tion. In this thesis only associations and includes were used, which are symbolized
by dotted arrows and simple lines.
The system architecture diagram was done in a non standardized but simple and self-
explanatory way.
For databases a cylinder form was used and the different sub-systems are symbolized as
rectangles. Arrows show the relation between components and the standard or format
that is used for communication. Their color indicates the context of the data (identifiable
or de-identified data).
3.5 Tools used
For modeling the use case diagram Eclipse Modeling Tools10 in combination with the
Papyrus plugin11 were used. The open source tool OpenOffice12 Draw was used for
the system architecture. BPMN diagrams were created using the open source tool
Yaoqiang BPMN13. For literature research the reference manager Mendeley14 was used
and typesetting was done with LYX 1.6.715. A literature database, using BibTex16, was
set up as well which was kept synchronized with Mendeley.
10Version: Helios Service Release 2.
11The plugin enables Eclipse to model UML 2.2 diagrams including Activity, Class, Communication,









This chapter contains all the information that was collected for this thesis. It starts
with Vanderbilt’s system architecture, use cases and processes followed by a comparison
of privacy laws of Germany and USA and ends with an analysis of the applicability of
Vanderbilt’s research databases using German laws and TMF’s data privacy concept.
4.1 Vanderbilt
4.1.1 System architecture
This section describes the system architecture of Vanderbilt relating to its secondary use
system and research databases.
The system can be separated in a hospital-internal and a hospital-external part with the
data superiority and the responsibility to ensure patient privacy being on the internal
side. As such, VUMC can’t transmit data that leaves its oversight, unless it’s already
de-identified. This is why the de-identification process1 has to take place under the
supervision of Vanderbilt. DNA is sensitive material in itself and will not leave the
oversight of the hospital. In this work the sphere of influence of VUMC will include the
Hospital Information System (HIS), DNA storage and an Extract Transform Load (ETL)
Layer.
The hospital-external part of the system is named Research resource2 in this thesis. It
includes databases, procedures and processes that enable the researcher to use the system
for medical research purposes.
1Described in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
2Def: “The funding, research facilities, and materials available for research”
http://de.dict.md/definition/Resource; visited: 13.07.2011.
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Figure 4.1: System architecture
All the source information is hosted in the HIS. It is located in one central system
called StarChart3. StarChart is the central storage and all the other sub-systems like the
Enterprise Data Warehouse, Laboratory Information System (LIS), Radiology Information
System (RIS),... communicate with it through a Generic interface engine, which acts as
a Communication server. This star-like topology reduces the amount of interfaces to n
from n(n-1) for point-to-point models for example.
The Enterprise Data Warehouse has two databases with relevant information, one with
ICD 9 and Current Procedural Terminology (CPT)4 codes and a second one, which
contains billing information of every patient. More comprehensive information can be
found in the clinical systems. They include databases that contain notes and text reports,
3See Section 2.2.1.




clinical messages, structured data like laboratory information from the LIS, medication
and Care Provider Order Entry (CPOE) data.
StarChart is connected to the ETL Layer and sends documents in the Medical Archival
and Retrieval System (MARS) format5, where they get processed before they enter the
Research Resource.
The ETL Layer is responsible for the de-identification of every document and several
processes de-identify the different documents types (narrative text documents, semi-
structured and structured data). Those processes are explained in detail in the subsequent
chapters. Additionally the ETL Layer takes care of the de-identification of the blood
samples as well. The samples themselves are stored in the DNA storage and are only
taken out when needed for sequencing. A random exclusion of about 2% of the blood
samples is done before the DNA gets extracted and stored. This is done to mask the
patient group with genetic information in BioVU and in this way strengthen the patients
privacy.
The de-identified data then get stored in the Research resource, more precisely EMR
documents in SD’s database and de-identified DNA samples get stored in the hospital-
internal DNA storage. When a research project needs genetic information the DNA gets
sequenced and the data gets stored in BioVB’s database, which is located in the Research
resource. All the documents in the SD and the information in BioVU get linked via
hashed Medical Record Number (MRN) codes that are in turn connected to an identifier
(ID). This ID is later linked to one or more Research Unique Identifier (RUI)’s. Every
research project and every researcher has its individual and unique RUI. This is done
so that the same patient will appear with a different number for different researchers.
However, if one researcher is part of two or more research projects, the same patient gets
the same number for all the projects the researcher partakes in.
Depending on the “project type” (standard SD GUI or “individual access”) research
project information gets stored in a Project cache or it gets extracted out of the regular
SD DB into a Local DB.
A separate part of the Research resource are Data quality improvement algorithms which
are executed on an irregular basis. Their goal is to improve the data quality by finding
5The MARS format was developed at the University of Pittsburgh to make its university hospitals EMR
more accessible. An example of a MARS message can be found in the Appendix Figure 5.13.
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missed PHI and removing or scrubbing the found information.
Vanderbilt does not include MMO’s like X-ray and ultrasound images or sound files in its
research databases, only Electrocardiogram (ECG) images are available. MMO’s are not
included because of their generally large sizes, which would result in slow response times.
Consent storage
The patients consents get captured either with consent to treat form documents, which
get scanned and saved into the EMR or electronically via “check in kiosks”, depending
on the clinic the patients check into.
The patients decision regarding the consent of using leftover blood samples for BioVU is
stored as a bit in SD’s database.
The scanned documents themselves get not stored in SD, since their de-identification
can’t be guaranteed yet.
4.1.2 Use cases
Figure 4.2 shows the diagram of identified use cases and the involved actors.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: Opt out
Description: This use case allows the Patient to opt out of the usage of his leftover
blood for research purposes.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: Discard blood sample
Description: In Vanderbilt leftover blood usually gets discarded every three days.
However the leftover blood can be used for genomic research if the patients didn’t opt
out. This use case includes the use case De-identify blood sample and is extended by the
use case Extract DNA.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: De-identify blood sample
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Figure 4.2: Use Case diagram of SD and BioVU
Description: Every patients data must be de-identified before it can be shared and
used for research. De-identification for blood samples is done by hashing the MRN
and relabeling the tube with the hashed number. The exact de-identification process is
described in Section 4.2.3. This use case includes the use case Check consent.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: Check consent
Description: When a patient gets admitted, he or she has to sign a Consent to Treatment
Form. On the last page, right above the signature line is an option to opt out of BioVU.
If the patient does not check the box, his or her leftover blood can be used for genomic
research later on. This consent is checked before a blood sample is about to be discarded.
System: Laboratory
Use Case Name: Extract DNA
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Description: DNA gets extracted out of the blood samples so that it can be stored
more easily. Storing the tubes themselves would be to impractical. This use case includes
the use case Store DNA.
System: Laboratory
Use Case Name: Store DNA
Description: This use case is included by Extract DNA and handles the physical storage
of the extracted DNA samples.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: Update SD
Description: Data of new patients and new documents of existing patients have to
be send to SD. This gets triggered by A System. This use case includes the use cases
De-identify new EMR data and Send de-identified EMR data to SD.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: De-identify new EMR data
Description: Every patients data must be de-identified before it can be shared and
used for research. De-identification is done for patients documents to ensure a patients
privacy rights. The exact de-identification process for EMR data is described in section
4.2.2. This use case is included by Update SD.
System: VUMC
Use Case Name: Send de-identified EMR data to SD
Description: De-identified patient data gets send to the SD where it is used for medical
research. This use case is included by Update SD.
System: SD
Use Case Name: Receive and save de-identified data
Description: After the EMR data gets de-identified it gets send to the SD. Here it is
received and saved for later use. The data is saved in a database and in an adequate
form. This use case is included by Send de-identified data to SD.
System: Synthetic Derivative
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Use Case Name: Continuous data quality improvement
Description: Natural language processing will always miss PHI, even if its only a small
percentage. To meet privacy concerns, algorithms get executed on an irregular basis to
increase the data quality of SD by searching and removing missed PHI. A System 2
executes this use case.
System: Research Environment
Use Case Name: Access data
Description: To allow the researcher to use the information in the database, the data
needs to made queryable and converted into an analyzable form. The Researcher accesses
SD to perform his research. This use case is extended by Request genomic data.
System: BioVU
Use Case Name: Request genomic data
Description: When a patient is eligible for a project but his genomic information got
not sequenced yet, a request for the sequencing of the genotype gets initiated. This use
case includes Sequence DNA.
System: Lab
Use Case Name: Sequence DNA
Description: Before genetic information can be used for research it needs to be sequenced.
Depending on the research project specific genotypes get sequenced from the stored DNA.
This use case includes Send sequenced data to BioVU.
System: Lab
Use Case Name: Send sequenced data to BioVU
Description: After the sequencing of the genotypes, the genetic information gets send
to BioVU for permanent saving and later use for research. This use case includes Receive
and safe sequenced data.
System: BioVU
Use Case Name:Receive and save sequenced data
Description: After the DNA gets sequenced in the laboratory the genotype information
gets send to BioVU. Here it is received and stored for research. The genomic information
is saved in a database in an adequate form.
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4.2 Workflow and Processes
The following section describes the processes that are related to secondary use in Vander-
bilt. The first subchapter covers the authorization processes for SD and BioVU, as well a
“feasibility determination process”. The second subchapter highlights the de-identification
process of textual data, while the third subchapter focuses on the de-identification and
storage of genetic information and its usage. The fourth subchapter explains the data
extraction process, more precisely the tasks a researcher has to perform in order to get
his research cohorts and subsequently the data. The fifth subchapter shows ways, how
patient data from the SD is shared to other sites and the last subchapter highlights the
mechanism used to link the separate types of data.
4.2.1 Record Counter and Authorization Process
This section describes the steps that are needed to get approval for access to information
and data from SD and BioVU. Additionally this chapter covers and starts with the process
of the Record Counter which can be used to determine the feasibility of conducting
research using the SD.
There are two different ways for researchers to get access to data at Vanderbilt, depending
if only clinical data is needed or clinical data in combination with genomic data. It
might be beneficial, prior to starting either Authorization Process, to determine if the
preliminary work for the authorization is actually worth the time and effort. For this
purpose Vanderbilt developed the Record Counter, which allows users, who have a
Vanderbilt University ID to query the SD for aggregated information.
Record Counter: As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the Researcher dispatches a query, for
example “male patients” and the ICD code for headache. The Record Counter receives
and processes the query before it sends a response with the aggregated information
back. The response is a number that has to be greater than five and contains limited
demographic information like gender. The Researcher receives the result and determines
if the SD has enough patients for his contemplated research project6.
6Screenshots from the Record Counter can be found in the Appendix A, Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.
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Figure 4.3: Record Counter
SD authorization: Figure 4.4 shows the business process for authorization to SD. First
a researcher has to prepare a research proposal and submit it to the Institutional Review
Board (IRB), which is indicated as a message flow in the diagram. After receiving and
reviewing the proposal, the IRB committee has to decide whether to accept or decline it.
If the proposal is declined a negative message get send back to the researcher. He then
has the alternative to improve and resubmit it or end the process. The process ends at
End Event B, if the researcher decides that he doesn’t want to re-file the proposal.
Alternatively, if the IRB accepts the proposal a positive message gets send to the researcher
whereupon he has to sign a Data Use Agreement (DUA), which forbids attempts of
re-identification (among other things). A message that the DUA has been signed gets
send to VUMC, which then in turn approves the authorization and gives the researcher
access to SD. The process ends with End Event A in the case of a positive application.
BioVU authorization: The process for getting access to BioVU (alongside SD) is
similar to getting access to SD only and is depicted in Figure 4.5. In addition to the SD
authorization process, for access to BioVU, the proposal has to be send to the BioVU
Overview Board (BioVU OB) as well. If either the IRB or the BioVU OB decline the
proposal a message gets send to the researcher, that either one (or both boards) declined
it and the researcher can decide if he wants to improve the proposal again. The process
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Figure 4.4: Authorization SD
ends at End Event B, if the researcher doesn’t want to mend it.
However if both boards accept the proposal the researcher gets notified and has to sign a
DUA as well and a message gets send to VUMC. After receiving the DUA VUMC will
grant the researcher authorization to use both research databases for his project.

The two processes for data authorization and the Record Counter process are not
represented in the use case diagram. These processes represent “policy processes” and
the use case diagram focuses on the technical aspects.
4.2.2 De-identification Process
The following subsection will describe how patient information from the EMR is de-
identified before it ends up in the SD. The de-identification process (Figure 4.6) covers
the de-identification of different types of documents.
Three different kinds of patient data were found: Structured data, Semi-structured data
and Narrative text documents, which could also be described as unstructured data.
The process starts with the hashing of the MRN. The hashing algorithm computes
h(MRN), which will always be the same for the same patient and doesn’t allow a
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Figure 4.5: Authorization BioVU
conclusion to the original number. After the hashing, the h(MRN)-output gets used
as input for the next task, which creates a Date shift value. The task uses a certain,
undisclosed part of h(MRN) to calculate the value, which in turn gets used to de-identify
date attributes later on. After the calculation of the date shift different routes are taken,
depending if structured or non-structured documents have to be de-identified.
Non-structured documents first enter a Pre-processing task where the data gets
converted into a specific input format for the following steps. Certain regions in the
documents, that should not be changed, get tagged and PHI gets removed, where it
is known that the next step, the actual de-identification task, misses them. The De-
identification task uses a commercial tool for the natural language processing called
DE-ID from DE-ID Data Corp.7. DE-ID replaces all PHI found with tags, for example
7See Chapter 2.2.2.
39
Figure 4.6: De-identification of medical data
NAME[XXX,YYY] and shifts all dates back in time. The “Date shift value” from earlier
is used as input for the date shifting and miscellaneous lists, such as staff lists, street
names, etc. as are used as input as well, to help with PHI identification. Libraries like
UMLS get included to help distinguishing between names and diseases. An example is
the name Chron, which could be a patients name but in combination with the prefixed
word Morbus its apparent to the system that a disease it meant.
Structured data gets de-identified on a different way. Since the PHI locations are
known, de-identification is done by the task “Homemade algorithm de-identification”.
Sophisticated and computationally intensive NLP algorithms are not needed.
After the de-identification of structured or non-structured documents, the h(MRN) gets
appended to the data again, to ensure that all documents of a patient can be linked
together. Before the process ends, the de-identified documents get stored in the SD for
later usage by researchers.

The process is represented by the use cases Update SD and subsequently by De-identify
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new EMR data, Send de-identified data to SD and Receive and safe de-identified data.
4.2.3 DNA Processes
The next two processes characterizes how genetic data ends up in BioVU and how it gets
extracted again for research. Figure 4.7 shows how the genetic information gets stored
while Figure 4.8 shows the usage process of the data.
Figure 4.7: DNA storage
Blood samples that are about to be discarded still contain the MRN in form of a barcode
on their tubes. These codes get scanned and hashed in task Hash MRN. Afterwards the
samples get checked for eligibility8 and if they pass the tubes get re-labeled with the
hashed MRN-code h(MRN). The blood sample gets discarded as they normally would if
they are not eligible and the process ends with End Event B. After the relabeling of the
eligible tubes, the samples move on to the next task where the DNA gets extracted and
stored in before the process ends. This storage is not BioVU yet, which only contains
the sequenced data, but a store for physical DNA samples.
8A list of criteria for eligibility can be found in the Appendix Figure 5.2.
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Figure 4.8: DNA usage
The DNA usage process starts with a query to SD/BioVU. If all the patients in the result
set have the wanted genomic information in BioVU already, the process ends with End
Event A1. Otherwise the task Request missing genomic information gets executed. The
message flow from the collection Research data set to the task symbolizes the input of
IDs, so that only DNA from not yet available patients gets requested. After the request,
the DNA of the patients with the missing genomic information gets sequenced. The
sequenced data gets added to the Research result set as well as to BioVU. This is done
so that later research projects can reuse the existing data as well. The process ends with
End Event A2.

The use cases Extract DNA with Store DNA and Discard blood samples with subsequently
De-identify blood sample and Check consent represent the DNA storage process. Request
genomic data, Sequence DNA, Send sequence data to BioVU and Receive and save
sequenced data represent the DNA usage process.
4.2.4 Data Extraction Process
The Data extraction process describes the steps researchers have to take, in oder to get
their research data out of the SD and BioVU. Preliminary work for authorization is dealt
with in Section 4.2.1.
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Figure 4.9: Data extraction process
There are two different ways a researcher can acquire his data from SD, either through
the standardized way using the build in Graphical User Interface (GUI) or a custom way
that includes extracting data out of SD. The GUI or tools for the custom way to view
the extracted files have to be developed or bought separately. For the usage of genomic
data only the standard GUI can be used.
The custom way starts with a researcher sending a query to the SD. The SD receives the
query and processes it. Afterwards a result set gets send back to the researcher, who
receives the Extracted data and stores it in an external database. The researcher then
has to check the patient documents manually and decide if his query result is precise
enough9 or if he has to improve his query/query algorithm again. If the PPV for the
9A result set is not precise enough, if too many patients do not have the illness or condition, the
researcher was looking for. False positive hits might occur for example when symptoms are similar for
two different conditions or for wrong documentation. The Positive Predictive Value (PPV) thats high
enough has to be set by the researcher themselves.
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result set is high enough, the researcher can continue and start his actual research.
The standard way uses a GUI that is accessible to all researchers with access to the
research databases. The researcher sends a request to the databases using the standard
GUI. The DBs receive, processes and sends a response back. The researcher then gets a
list of patients and has the option to view the patients documents and include them in
his research record set or not. If the researcher uses BioVU and need DNA from patients
sequenced, the process from the previous section gets executed. For simplicity of the
process this was not modelled.
The difference between both approaches is that in the custom way data gets pulled out
of the SD and stored in an separate DB, while the data stays in the SD for the standard
way. The extraction requires the SD to search through all the data contained in the DB
just once, while the standard way requires the SD to operate on the DB every single time
a patient is accessed. This results in slower response times for the standard way. This
advantage of the custom way gets compensated by the need for an own GUI and tools
to process the extracted data. Another thing to consider is that the extracted data is
object to privacy concerns, so the external DB has to ensure data privacy as well.

The process for data extraction is represented by the use case Access data in the Use
case diagram.
4.2.5 Data Sharing
The following section describes how data that was once in Vanderbilt’s EMR can be
shared with other institutions, repositories or the researchers in general. The dotted
arrow in the picture depicts a possible way of data sharing, while the continuous arrows
describe actual scenarios.
As explained in Chapter 2.3.1 HIPAA defines three distinct methods of data sharing where
a patients consent is not needed, Safe Harbor, Limited data sets and Statistical methods.
Natural language processing can never be perfect and there is always a possibility that
PHI are missed. In order to address this issue Vanderbilt considers the data in the SD a
sort of Limited data set and constrains the researcher to sign a Data use agreement. The
exact course of action for this method is described in Chapter 4.2.1.
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Figure 4.10: Data sharing diagram of Vanderbilt
A different way to data sharing is the aforementioned Safe Harbor method. Here all 18
PHI as defined by HIPAA have to be removed from the data sets, before the covered
entity10 is allowed to share the data. Public sharing is permitted with this method as
well as sharing to public repositories. Vanderbilt uses this practice to share its data to
dbGaP, the database of Genotypes and Phenotypes11.
The more sophisticated way to share data are Statistical methods. Data sets that are
de-identified with his method are shared to other repositories and recipients on a case
to case basis by Vanderbilt. Source data can come from the identifiable EMR or the
de-identified SD, as is depicted in the diagram.
A theoretical method for data sharing, but not used by Vanderbilt, would be using the
Safe Harbor method on non de-identified EMR data. This possibility is pictured by a
dotted arrow in the graph.
10See Chapter 2.3.1.
11Public repository for individual-level phenotype, exposure, genotype, and sequence data, and the
associations between them created by National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI)[Kelley,
2008] which is part of NIH; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap; visited: 13.07.2011.
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4.2.6 Data Linking Method and Hashing
In SD and BioVU several different data types, like structured laboratory data, unstruc-
tured CPOE documentation or genomic information get linked together. This section
highlights the linking mechanism that is used (Figure 4.11).
The main component in the linking of multiple documents is an undisclosed hashing
function. The algorithm computes always the same output for the same input value, in
this case a MRN, and the resulting h(MRN) can not be calculated back to its original
number (= one-way-hashing function). The one-way-hash satisfies the privacy concerns,
since the identity can’t be backtracked and the h(MRN) ensures that all documents of
one patient can be easily linked together.
Figure 4.11: Linking method using hashing algorithm
4.3 Vanderbilt’s Data Security Concept
As can be seen in the chapters above, the security concept of Vanderbilt consists of




On a policy level, the privacy gets protected by two major methods. First of all not
everyone has access to SD and BioVU. Access is only granted to Vanderbilt employees
and only after IRB and BioVU Overview Board/Operations Advisory Board approved of
the research project.
Secondly, even though the documents in SD are de-identified users are required to sign a
DUA. NLP algorithms will never find all PHI, so this method ensure that the privacy
of the patients is better protected. The DUA requires missed PHI to be reported and
forbids re-identification attempts and its violation will result in penal consequences. In
this aspect SD’s policy is similar to HIPAA’s Limited Data Set, but not the same.
Technological Means
The first and most important technological method of securing the patients privacy is
the de-identification12. Vanderbilt uses the methods of suppression, generalization and
randomization described in Chapter 2.5. In SD suppression is done on identifiers like
names and numbers like the Social Security Number for example. Those attributes are
highly risky and don’t serve any medical research purpose so they can get removed.
HIPAA’s privacy rule requires dates and ages over 89 years to be aggregated into a single
category of age 90 or older, so DE-ID automatically uses generalization here. Vanderbilt
uses a sort of randomization for its date representation in SD. Dates get shifted back in
time by 1-365 days. This date-shift-value however is not completely random, but gets
generated using the hashed MRN. The algorithm to creating the date-shift-value is not
disclosed and the value can’t be predict for a given MRN. So to the outsider the date
shift appears to be random.
Another means of technologically securing the privacy is the project specific login and
password that get created after the overview boards approve of the projects. Additionally
all access is logged and the log-files can be checked if any inconsistencies appear.
The technological data privacy means can be roughly depicted as seen in Figure 4.12.
12See Chapter 4.2.2.
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GDAT = Genomic Data
MDAT = Medical Data
PHI = Protected Health Information
MRN = Medical Record Number
h(MRN) = hashed MRN
Figure 4.12: Data privacy concept - technological means
Re-identification Risks / Trail Re-identification
The data saved in SD is de-identified, which means that names, IDs, geographical
attributes, contact information,... got removed, dates shifted and ages changed respec-
tively13. Chapter 2.5 highlighted that anonymous looking data doesn’t necessarily protect
a persons privacy. This chapter approaches the risk of re-identification for SD.
Since most of the identifiers specified in HIPAA get removed via suppression they are
irrelevant for risk assessment. These specific attributes have no medical relevance, so it
can be removed without any concern, with the exception of geographical data which could
be used for epidemiological studies. Dates and gender are more interesting, since medical
conditions can be gender constrained or more/less likely at certain ages. Furthermore
time spans can be of interest, if studies are conducted where its evaluated how long
it took for a certain therapy to be effective for example. A journalist re-identification
scenario14 is unlikely, since no attribute of the PHI list is left unchanged. For example,
dates can’t be match against those of other (public) databases and names are completely
removed.
13Complete list see Appendix Figure 5.11.
14See Chapter 2.5.
48
Figure 2.5 shows that the likelihood of re-identification drastically sinks if the geographical
region increases and even more if the age or DOB get less specific. Sweeney used three
attributes for those numbers however, of which SD doesn’t have the geography identifiers,
the DOB is randomized and only the gender is available. With the DOB shifted back
by up to a year, the plausibility for this attribute would lie between Birth year and 2yr
Age, so even if a additional third attribute could be found to replace geography, the
percentage of re-identification would most likely still be small.
Re-identification based on prosecutor re-identification scenario: Even if an “attacker”
gets access to the data from SD it doesn’t mean that he’s automatically able to identify
a person of his interest. No attribute of the PHI list is left unchanged, but since SD is
not k-anonymous or k-unlinkable, no guarantee can be given that the attacker wouldn’t
find his target. However, if the attacker knows the visitation dates he could match those
against visits from patients in SD and might be able to re-identify his target based on
the intervals.
SD was not designed to ensure patient privacy using methods like k-anonymity or k-
unlinkability, to avoid the loss of data quality which is inherent with those methods.
Instead Vanderbilt applies policy and technological means, which allows for ample
security while allowing maximum research possibilities. Furthermore is SD not meant to
be publicly shared but supposed to be used as a means for medical research at Vanderbilt.
4.4 Law and Concept Comparisons
4.4.1 Comparison German Laws
A small analysis of the privacy laws of Germany for five of the 16 states (Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Rhineland-Palatinate)
and the Federal Data Protection Act concluded that the usage of patient data for
secondary use or research is permitted, with the general constraint that patients have to
give consent first.
All state laws except the privacy law of Baden-Württemberg allow the usage and trans-
mission of data after the patient gave consent. Baden-Württemberg permits transmission
generally, if its for scientific research for the hospital.
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Some paragraphs state that identifying patient attributes have to be saved separately
from the medical data and be deleted (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania: Hospital Act
Section 20 subsection 4) or anonymized (Bavaria: SDPA Section 23 subsection 3) once
they are not needed for research anymore.
Baden-Württemberg’s Section 50 subsection 1, among others, states that consent has to
be obtained in individual cases and consent approval in general admission requirements
is not permitted.
4.4.2 Comparison US - Germany
There are a few differences between US and German laws regarding patient privacy and
data transmission.
Depending on the state in Germany, different laws apply (see table 2.1) while there is
one major law in the US (HIPAA). On the one hand German laws leave the identifying
attributes open, whereas in contrast HIPAA exactly specifies which criteria have to be
removed and additionally that as an alternative statistic methods can be applied as well.
On the other hand in the US re-identification (through means of pseudonyms) are not
mandatory, while in Germany patients have to be informed if a study concluded that
they have medical condition. German laws also state, that identifying attributes have
to be kept separate from non-identifying attributes, while PHI can be scrubbed in the
US, to satisfy legislature. As a last point some German state laws explicitly state, that
patients have to give consent to the usage of data for secondary use on a research or
project-related basis and that general permission for data usage is not allowed.
4.4.3 SD/BioVU with German Laws
The methods and concepts of SD and BioVU can not be copied to Germany one-to-one.
Organizational processes like the Authorization process can be adopted, whereas technical
processes such as the de-identification are not compatible with German laws.
After de-identification of textual data and blood samples, the usage of the data is
considered “non-human subjects” research in the US, which means that it can be shared.
In Germany however, data processing is generally only allowed, if permitted by law or
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after a person gave consent15. The automatic transmission of anonymized data or data
with pseudonyms from the EMR to a research database as done with the SD would not
be possible. As mentioned in the chapter above, some German states forbid the consent
form to be on the general permission for data usage. So at least in some German states,
BioVU’s opt out model would not be possible.
Vanderbilt’s authorization process could be adapted to Germany as well, no laws were
found that prohibit a procedure in this way.
Germany does not have a list of PHI, but identifying attributes have to be saved separately
from medical data in some states, so the de-identification of EMR data can’t be copied as a
whole. However, if the processes that handle the de-identification tasks would be replaced
by processes that separate MDAT and IDAT and anonymize or create pseudonyms (from
the IDAT), the general concept could be carried over.
The GGDA states, that if a patient gave his consent, his genetic sample may be used for
other purposes than it was acquired for, for example for a research database. Vanderbilt’s
processes for DNA storage and usage are applicable with German laws as well. Only the
opt out approach would not be feasible and therefore can’t be used.
Data extraction and Data sharing are applicable with German law as well, if the patient
got informed before signing a consent that his non-identifiable data get used for research
or send to other research sites.
4.4.4 SD/BioVU and TMF’s Data Privacy Concept
This chapter compares SD’s and BioVU’s privacy concept against TMF’s Models A, B
and BMB (Chapter 2.4 ). When talking about Vanderbilt’s concept it is referred to as it
is depicted in Figure 4.12.
Model A
The biggest difference between Model A and Vanderbilt’s data privacy concept is that
the direct care context is not given in Vanderbilt.
15FDPA Section 4 Subsection 1.
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The method for removing the link between a patients identity and his medical data
also differs between the two models. In Vanderbilt the data gets de-identified, which
means that PHI get removed or replaced with “synthetic information”16, while Model
A propagates a Patientlist at a TTP. There IDAT gets replaced by a PID and the link
between IDAT and PID gets stored for later re-identification. Re-identification is not
possible in Vanderbilt’s concept, since no link between PHI and an identifier gets created
and saved. The hashed MRN in Vanderbilt’s concept can only be used to link different
documents of the same patient17.
Model B
Model B is more similar to Vanderbilt’s concept than Model A, on one hand because the
context is the same for both concepts. The data that will be saved in to the central DB
(SD in Vanderbilt’s case) is already entered into the hospitals EMR and a direct care
context, like in Model A, is not given anymore. On the other hand both concepts differ
in their underlying ideas and therefore in their methods used. The big difference is, that
Model B allows re-identification and Vanderbilt’s concept doesn’t. Model B masks the
link between identity and MDAT on two instances, first at a TTP where the IDAT get
replaced by a PID and on a second TTP where a pseudonym is generated out of the PID,
before the data enters a central DB. Since Vanderbilt doesn’t have a re-identification
option, the data gets de-identified and can be stored in SD. In Model B the MDAT get
additionally sent to the central DB in an encrypted way. This extra step doesn’t have to
be done in Vanderbilt, since a TTP doesn’t have to be passed through.
Model BMB
As explained in Chapter 2.2 TMF’s Model BMB complies with Model B, so the similarities
for medical data wouldn’t be addressed again. Instead the focus will be on the biobank
part of both concepts.
The Sample DB and Analysis DB from TMF’s concept are similarly implemented in
Vanderbilt. Samples are saved in the storage for extracted DNA samples (called DNA
16See Chapter 2.2.2 about de-identification for more detailed information.
17See Chapter 4.2.6 for more information.
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storage in Figure 4.1) and the Analysis DB equals BioVU, where the sequenced information
is saved.
The difference lies in the way the genetic data is accessed. After sequencing the DNA
in Vanderbilt, the sequenced data and the hashed MRN get merged together again.
In Model BMB however the sequenced data get saved with the ID AnaDAT. So when
combining medical information and genetic data, the linkage is done by using the h(MRN)
in Vanderbilt and not via a “chain of IDs” as its done in Modell BMB.
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5 Discussion and Outlook
This chapter discusses the methods used in this thesis and the outcome of the results.
Furthermore the issues that were initially addressed will be highlighted and at the end
an outlook will be given.
5.1 Methods
At the beginning the objectives and exact goals of this thesis were not completely specified,
so the initial literature research was very unspecific. However the first papers and the
initial literature that was supplied gave an introduction and sense for the subject.
In regards to the legal texts the German states were not randomly picked. The state
of Baden-Württemberg was chosen, because the University of Heidelberg and the ZIM
are located there. Bavaria, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate were selected because they
border Baden-Württemberg. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania was chosen because the ZIM
has a cooperation with the University of Greifswald that’s located there. Only five out of
the 16 German states were picked, because the focus wasn’t to be on law analysis, but
to give insight on the judicial framework of Germany. The legal part was not the main
focus of this thesis. Goal of that chapter wasn’t a detailed and cast-iron analysis, but to
give insight for the legal situation.
To get an overview of the judicial situation in the US not the HIPAA itself was read, but
rather educational material provided by the National Institute of Health (NIH).
A five week stay in Vanderbilt was done to get a first hand experience and to research the
secondary use systems. There interviews were held, a second literature research done and
essential knowledge for this thesis gained. The Interviews were not done by any standard
or standard form. The goal was information gathering and not a statistical evaluation, so
the method seemed appropriate. To capture different perspectives, people from different
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working-backgrounds were interviewed. This was also needed because different areas of
expertise has to be covered like technical backgrounds and usage experience to name a
few.
For the process diagrams the BPMN 2 standard was used for two main reasons. Introduc-
tory knowledge about the standard and its usage was already known and the information
could be put down on paper in a more understandable way. Standards like UML 2 or
Dataflow Diagrams1 were taken into consideration and prototyped as well, but considered
less suited and harder to understand upon review. The possibility that the usage for
those standards was less sound can’t be excluded, but using BPMN and not a Dataflow
or Sequence diagram for example allows for a more strategical and less technical view.
This in turn gives a broader range of people the chance to understand the diagrams.
The system architecture diagram was created in a non standardized way. No suitable
standard could be found so it was created similar to architecture diagrams found in initial
literature. To ensure correctness of depiction several reviews were done.
A use case diagram by the UML standard was created as well. It was made to allow a
graphical representation of the functionality of the systems and to show the interaction
between different actors.
5.2 Results and Conclusion
An analysis of the secondary use systems SD and BioVU from Vanderbilt was created
and the comparison against German privacy concepts and legislature demonstrated that
the processes would be compatible with Germany if some adaptions would be made. The
biggest discrepancy derives from the differences in German and American laws, that
in Germany patients have to be re-identifiable and that IDAT and MDAT have to be
separately stored, which is not the case in the US.
The comparison of the processes also identified, that while technical aspects have to be
different the overlaying procedures, like the Authorization Process, can be easily adopted.
This would mainly impact the anonymization, where de-identification methods can’t be
1Dataflow Diagrams by Yourden’s Notation
http://yourdon.com/strucanalysis/wiki/index.php?title=Chapter_9; visited: 12.07.2011.
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applied, but a generation of pseudonyms like suggested by the TMF would have to be
implemented.
Storage and usage of genetic information would be compatible in general, but an opt
out model like it is implemented in Vanderbilt would not be in accordance with German
laws. In Germany the consent has to be acquired on a case-by-case basis and may not
be included in the general admission form. However, when a sample is obtained, the
same processes could be applied. The same is true for SD, with the exception of the
de-identification processes, the general procedure of usage could adopted for, from the
technical standpoint as well as the usage of the research environment.
The opt out approach for BioVU and the usage of EMR data from every patient leaves
Vanderbilt with the advantage of accumulating huge amounts of clinical and genomic
information, which other databases will not be able to collect. Due to this circumstance
the databases make attractive targets, since an intrusion would be profitable because of
the size, although its questionable if any patients privacy could be compromised because
of the security measures undertaken.
Not all types of security risks for the data were covered in this work. Technical security
aspects like regular software updates, secure connections and so forth are within the
scope of the thesis, but the risk for SD from re-identification was discussed. A trail
re-identification attack is less likely in Germany however. Public databases, like hospital
discharge summaries or voter registries are not as common in Germany as they are in
the US, so the access to information is not as easy to obtain.
This work showed that Vanderbilt’s secondary use systems are at large compatible with
German laws. Single methods have to be modified, but it was shown that the overall
processes can be used in accordance with the TMF’s data privacy concepts Model B and
Model BMB.
Although, for the regulatory framework of the US, the implementation of Vanderbilt was
investigated only, it was shown that procedures between both countries can be exchanged
and collaboration for those types of projects is within the realm of possibility. Other
projects or theses who investigate the topics of secondary use, research databases and its
feasibility for collaboration between German and American institutions or sites can use
this thesis as a starting point for their work.
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5.3 Outlook
It has been shown that privacy concepts for research databases are similar in the US and
Germany, and the hope is that this work helps find a common ground for institutions in
both countries to work closer together.
With more and more projects and systems covering the subject of secondary use and
the ever increasing costs in the health care sector in general, more standardization,
collaboration and exchange of experiences is desirable. The TMF in Germany and the
eMERGE network2 in the US seems to be on a good way towards this goal on a national
level.
It has yet to been seen, if the high hopes in secondary use systems get fulfilled, and
the resources invested pay off. In a couple of years studies can be conducted that give
conclusions about the cost-benefit-estimations and ascertain if secondary use data bases
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Figure 5.2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for blood samples [Roden, 2008]
Figure 5.3: Linking to re-identify data [Sweeney, 2000, page 3]
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Figure 5.4: Record Counter query screen[Masys, 2010, slide 19]
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Figure 5.5: Record Counter - multiple query attributes [Masys, 2010, slide 20]
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Figure 5.6: Record Counter - Result screen [Masys, 2010, slide 21]
Figure 5.7: DE-ID example [Presentation Wasserstrom, 2010, slide 12]
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Figure 5.8: Overmarking examples [Presentation Masys, 2010, slide 16]








2. All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city,
county, precinct, ZIP Code, and their equivalent geographical codes, except for
the initial three digits of a ZIP Code if, according to the current publicly available
data from the Bureau of the Census:
a. The geographic unit formed by combining all ZIP Codes with the same three initial
digits contains more than 20,000 people.
b. The initial three digits of a ZIP Code for all such geographic units containing 20,000
or fewer people are changed to 000.
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages
over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that
such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older.
4. Telephone numbers.
5. Facsimile numbers.
6. Electronic mail addresses.
7. Social security numbers.
8. Medical record numbers.
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers.
10. Account numbers.
11. Certificate/license numbers.
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers.
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers.
14. Web universal resource locators (URLs).
15. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers.
16. Biometric identifiers, including fingerprints and voiceprints.
17. Full-face photographic images and any comparable images.
18. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, unless otherwise
permitted by the Privacy Rule for re-identification.
Figure 5.11: PHI as defined by HIPAA; [NIH, 2004, page 14]
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1. Names.
2. Postal address information, other than town or city, state, and ZIP Code.
3. Telephone numbers.
4. Fax numbers.
5. Electronic mail addresses.
6. Social security numbers.
7. Medical record numbers.
8. Health plan beneficiary numbers.
9. Account numbers.
10. Certificate/license numbers.
11. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers.
12. Device identifiers and serial numbers.
13. Web universal resource locators (URLs).
14. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers.
15. Biometric identifiers, including fingerprints and voiceprints.
16. Full-face photographic images and any comparable images










This is a very-pleasant 55-year-old Vanderbilt professor of law who is here for a







Figure 5.13: MARS message example
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